Introduction
The two books under review here fall within a broad research agenda of anti-colonial international law scholarship.
1 They focus in particular on the question of international law and Eurocentricity, albeit from two rather different perspectives. Legal non-European relationships over time: firstly within the discursive context of European thought and secondly in the context of European imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns and Africans is a probing analysis of the universalistic claims of international law through an examination of the 'structures of the discourses' of both international law and politics in the context of Namibian decolonization, 6 while Legal Polycentricity examines the presence of non-European legal orders alongside the Eurocentric international law.
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IM£at23. Slnha has an Impressive portfolio of work on Afro-Asian perspectives of International law. He quotes no less than eight of his articles and books on this topic written between the period 1967 and 1993 and published not only In International law Journals and reviews but also In journals In other disciplines in the United States, Europe and Asia. For a sampling of Afro-Asian ana-colonial International law scholarship, see VK Snyder and S. Sathlrathal (eds.). Third World Attitudes toward International Law: An Introduction (1987) . Like Slnha and Afro-Asian scholars in the post-decolonixation period. In the Inter-war period Chilean international Jurist Aljejandro Alvarez argued that there was a separate American International law shared and observed between South American countries and in their relations with other American states and European states. See Alvarez, 'International life and International Law In America', 74 Bulletin of the Pan American Union (1940) 232. Manoel Alvaro de Souxa Sa Vlanna. a Brazilian International Jurist on the other hand contended that a group of problems and situations such as those common to Latin American countries was Insufficient to constitute the basis of an International law. In Sa Vienna's view, international law was constituted not by commonality of conditions between countries, but rather by the nature of the universal principles which underpin international society. M. Alvaro de S. Sa Vlanna, De la Non-Existence du droll International Amerkaln, (1912) . While the debate on the universality of International law took place among Latin American Jurists beginning at the end of the last century, for Asian and African scholars the debate took off after decolonisation.
In the Inter-war period, Soviet approaches to International law challenged the bourgeois underpinnings of International law. Soviet approaches are principally predicated on a contrasting ideological basis to bourgeois or capitalist law. namely, socialism. G.I. Tunkln, one of the leading Soviet International legal jurists, observed that one of the principles of Soviet internationalism, the International law governing relations between socialist states, was that of 'proletarian internationalism, which signified the fraternal friendship, dose co-operation, mutual assistance of the working dasses of various countries In the struggle for their liberation'. According to Tunkln. this principle (of proletarian Internationalism) emerged as the principle of the workers' movement when the development of capitalism and of the workers' movement itself attained a sufficiently high level The internationalization of the domination of capital, the Intensification of ties among the workers of Individual countries, the growth of the consciousness of the unity of purpose and the need for unified efforts of the proletariat of various nations In the struggle for their liberation and for the creation of a new society not knowing exploitation -these are the basic reasons for the emergence of the principle of proletarian internationalism.' See Gl Tunktn. Law (1974) . at 4. It Is noteworthy that notwithstanding its critique of liberal Internationalism which was predicated on universal models, Soviet Internationalism was based on the Idea that the proletariat of the Soviet Union and the West would liberate those of the rest of the world. Hence, Soviet internationalism. Just like liberalism, upon which modem International law is predicated, posits a 'universal system'. For a critique of the [allure of Soviet approaches to ground their approach to international law on Marxism, see B. S. Chlmni International Low and World Order. A Critique of Contemporary Approaches (1993) .
A Theory of International

Anti-Colonial Reconstructions of International Legal History
In Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns and Africans, Grovogul demonstrates how 'western notions of self and sovereignty have been grounded in claims of superiority, a higher knowledge of civil institutions, and a mission to elevate the other'.
8 South West Africa, present-day Namibia, provides the case study for this well-researched, well-written and well-argued book. Initially a PhD thesis, Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns and Africans explores the manner in which international law, its structures and institutions express European 'philosophic assumptions' that deny, erase or suppress 'nonEuropean subjectivity '. 9 For this reason. Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns and Africans represents a strong and rare form of anti-colonial international legal scholarship.
I Identify this form of anti-colonial International legal scholarship as strong because of the centrality its analysis places on the claims and role of economic, political, social and cultural superiority/inferiority in the historical relationship of colonized and colonizing countries in the past and the present The failure or lack of engagement with the 'coercive realities of colonial history and the current neo-colonial era' 10 is 'conducive to the preservation and continued development of a distorted "world view", since it allows for the historical erasure of imperial politics and, additionally, represses the record of contemporary forms of western power over the non-West '. 11 This strong form of international law scholarship self-identifies with group solidarity among less powerful countries. It expresses their desire for self-determination and autonomy from all forms of external or neo-colonial controls. In other words, as Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns and Africans illustrates, decolonization did not imply complete self-determination of the formerly colonized countries, in part because the process of decolonization was subject to a regime of international law complicit in the subjugation of non-European people.
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For its part. Legal Polycentriclty continues a weak tradition of Afro-Asian postdecolonization international legal anti-colonial scholarship, but in a new form. A major research theme that unites this diverse anti-colonial intellectual tradition is its primary focus on arguing about the limits within which the newly Independent nations of Asia and Africa would embrace an international law that was Eurocentric in its geographic origin, 13 Christian in its religious basis, imperial in its political objectives and mercantilist in its material underpinnings. 14 A vague but general consensus that had emerged in this tradition by the early 19 70s held that these newly independent countries would only accept those parts of international law that were not inconsistent with their independence. 15 universal character. It had nevertheless been cooceived simply for the use and benefit ofits founders, the states that were called 'dvllhed'. Bedjaoul, 'General Introduction'. In M. Bedjaoui, International law. Achievements and Prospects (1991) , at 5. Some recent work on the history of International law has suggested a more nuanced thinking about the European origins of International law. For example, the strict binary opposition between European and non-European Identities has now been problemauied as not only varied and fragmented, but also as having Intermingled and interacted in the course of the colonial encounter. In other words, the received history of international law to the effect that International law arose exclusively within the West has been revised In recent work that seeks to show how the history of the non-West was central to the construction of Important doctrines of International law such as sovereignty. In this new work, the non-West Is no longer represented as being outside the history of knowledge and the West as the sole and exclusive source of contemporary knowledge including International law. Antony Anghle's definitive study. 'Creating the Nation State: Colonialism and the Making of International Law', Sp Thesis, Harvard University. 1995. for example argues that the perceptions of non-Western people among Jurists of International law were central to the creation of international law as we know it today. This theme Is discussed further later In this essay. According to Prakash. 'Orientalism Now', 34 History and Theory (1995) , the fundamental Insight that traces 'the domination of the Other Into the very constitution of the West... [Is] a deep fissure on the operation of Western hegemony. There, the West appeared both to reach Its limits and to construct Its dominance. For If the West represented Itself as autonomous and universal In the domination of the Other, then the encounter with the "native" was the point of both the limit and the fabrication of such a representation.' Bedjaoul. supra note 13. at 6. Scholars in this tradition have sought an appropriate balance between realizing Independence from unequal relationships with former colonial countries and the post-Independence governments, on the one hand, and 'the responsibilities' of post-colonial states under International law which tend to compromise their independence, on the other hand. Consequently, a group of African international legal experts, meeting In 1967. observed that automatic succession of treaties entered Into by colonial governments, as required under the rules of treaty succession In customary international law, needed modification to bring them into conformity with the aspirations of newly Independent African countries. These experts noted that in <WtHing which International treaties the newly Independent African countries would choose to take over, they had to 'be aware of their responsibility to the International community [but] ... should strive to uphold the rule of law and the preservation of the international legal order'; see EX. Seaton and S.T. Malltt. Tanzania Treaty Practice (1973) . at 56. Similarly Mohammed Bed)aoui wonders how newly Independent African countries could at once attain full Independence from their repressive relationships with their former colonixing power, without simultaneously reordering the International legal, economic and political order. Bedjaoul observes that one of the tasks of International law is that of consolidating rather than transforming situations. Writing at the end of the 1970s, Bedjaoui Is sceptical of the possibilities of International law acting as an Instrument to transform International society and as such to usher m a New International Economic Order. His scepticism derives from the view that international law could not easily assume a new task (of transforming International society) since It b 'a law which hitherto has been confined to protecting a type of International relations not yet purged of Inequality and Imperialism', in M. Bedjaoul Towards A New International EconomkOrder (1979) . at 110.
The weak form of anti-colonial scholarship is basically integranonist meaning that it is largely complimentary of the liberatory claims of principles such as selfdetermination as uncompromising tenets of world peace and indicators of the rejection of the colonial experience and specifically as an expression of the value these principles uphold against the unacceptable repression of non-European humanity under colonialism, slavery and other forms of discrimination and repression of the non-European personality. This weak form of anti-colonial scholarship also uncritically endorses the United Nations agenda in areas such as human rights and the right to development as having potential and being of continuing benefit to the formerly colonized countries. The weak strand can only be understood alongside the strong variant which would regard the positions of the weak form not only as bordering on apology for their uncritical reflection of the promises of international law in the post-decolonization era, but also for repressing the record of post-colonial forms of Western and non-Western power over the non-West and "Third World' parts of the West Legal Polycentricity does not however mobilize similar evidence to make its case for the legitimacy of international law. Rather, it undertakes a detailed exploration of the different non-European civilhational experiences to prove the fact of their existence, much like Eurocentric civilhational experiences. Sinha maintains that examining non-European clvllizational experiences is more fruitful than reverting to 'the dead horse of questioning the validity of International law owing to the inclusion of non-European states in today's society of states '. 19 This position contrasts with Slnha's proposition in his 1967 book. New Nations and the Law of Nations, where he argued that the then newly independent Afro-Asian states aimed at, first 'preserving the rules of international law which help them exist as members of the society of states and are not inconsistent with their own interests'; second, 'the removal from the existing body of international law those rules which impair or prevent the realisation of their Interests'; and third 'the creation of new rules which would reap the maximum benefits from the international system'. 20 These three tenets characterize positions adopted within the weak tradition of Afro-Asian international legal scholarship especially in the 1960s and 1970s.
However, Legal Polycentricity shifts its attention from these traditional concerns of the weak form of anti-colonial scholarship to exploring how the 'single catalogue approach', or Western/Eurocentric approach to international law has prevented international law from 'being sufficiently responsive to the needs of this [civilizational] diversity'.
21 A significant point illustrating Sinha's departure from his earlier position is his caution in Legal Polycentricity that the lack of a genuinely Inter-civtlizational international law is not a reason 'for scrapping the international human rights program, but for improving it'.
22 By contrast, a major focus of the weak strain of anti-colonial scholarship was on the unfair nature of international law with respect to The concern with human rights, though part of the agenda within the weak strain during this earlier period, also symbolizes the migration from a concern with the more significant questions of self-determination, especially in the post-Cold-War period. In other words, the contested post-colonial settlements endorsed after the Second World War are, in Legal Polycentricity, taken for granted. The concern for human rights, though significant reflects a shift from a concern with the problematic character of international relations between countries with different levels of economic, political and social endowment as well as historically unequal relationships to a concern with the local conditions within each country, resulting In a narrowing of the larger international perspective within which the local or national can and ought to be seen. To the extent that Legal Polycentricity departs from a tradition of Afro-Asian scholarship which argues that customary international law was in part formed by Afro-Asian contributions, it also departs from the project of redefining and challenging categories such as backward, uncivilized and barbaric which were assigned to non-European communities by early European international law scholars.
25 A major aim of rewriting the history of international law in the weak strain of anti-colonial scholarship, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, was to correct the historical record: to rescue non-Europeans from their assigned place In the history of international law as backward, barbaric and uncivilized and hence Incapable of participating in the international legal order. 26 For example, some African scholars used historical evidence of the existence of ancient African Kingdoms or political units equivalent to, if not superior to, the 'modem' and 'civilized' Western states to disprove African inferiority on account of a lack of political units akin to those found in Western Europe. 
Limitations of Anti-Colonial Reconstructions
This reinterpretatlon of the writings of European international law by African scholars was in part buoyed and promoted by nationalist thought and scholarship in the hopeful moment of decolonization after the Second World War. However, this scholarship can only be regarded with ambivalence at best. From one perspective, this scholarship contributed immensely to questioning the 'objectivity' or fairness attributed to international law for playing a purportedly ameliorating role to colonial governance, a theme that Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns and Africans explores with virtuosity. This exposition was undoubtedly significant in its message of emancipation and liberation.
Yet, from another perspective this scholarship uncritically embraces international law in ways which Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns and Africans does not Instead, Grovogui develops an alternative critique of international law to that put forward by Legal Polycentridty in at least the following ways: (i) Legal Polycentridty fails to examine the continuity of structures of colonialism in countries that were ostensibly politically independent not merely because international law was Eurocentric but because it is 'built upon past philosophical foundations including political, legal, and cultural assimilation of the colonised into the structures of the global system' ;
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(ii) Legal Polycentridty pays inadequate or no attention to questions of power, hierarchy and ideology in endorsing the notion of civilizational pluralism. It is oblivious to the hegemonic status of international law, in so far as it shies away from examining the structural and cultural basis upon which colonial relationships were (and are) constructed and construed. In effect Legal Polycentridty may be said to constitute an endorsement of 'the authoritative discourse of international relations and Its assumptions... [and] Gates, speaking at a conference hosted by the University of Oklahoma on 'Preparing America's Foreign Policy for the 21st Century', stated that in the post Cold War period, Americans 'need to realhe that "the world is different but It Is not safe" because of ethnic religious and regional disputes'. Mr Gates warned that Americans should not become complacent since the economy was 'booming, unemployment Is low and there Is no superpower confrontation'. Mr Gates also referred to the control of remaining nuclear weapons In the former Soviet Union, the hostility of the governments of Iran and North Korea to me United States and the Colombian drug cartels as additional security threats. Consequently, Mr. Gates noted that 'the American Intelligence community must prevail by continuing Its unique analysis and clandestine collection capabilities that reside in no place else in government and take risks to get the information our nation's leaders need to protect American Interests'. See Dally Oklahoman, 13 September 1991. at 1. The view of cultural Incompatibility and hostility between Confucianism and Islam on the one hand, and liberal democratic ethos on the other hand, has been endorsed by S. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996) . In an earlier book, Huntington endorsed the view that Confucianism and Islam had attributes that were compatible with liberal democracy. See S. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (1991). For a review of this contrast of perspectives, see Gershman, The Clash within Qvlllxatlons'. 8 Journal of Democracy (1997) 165. For a review of some of the international law scholarship in this area see, Orford, The Uses of Sovereignty In the Imperial World Order 1 , 6 Australian Feminist law journal (1996) . The nature of the alleged source of threats to International peace and security In the post Cold War period Is a reflection that mainstream international law has now widely accepted identity politics as a serious threat to international peace and security In much the same way that Communism was during the Cold War. Consequently, critical analysis of the simplistic association of social disorder, civic decay and war wtth ethnicity and race suggests that race and ethnicity are now regarded by powerful interests and countries as thing* to contain with a view to guarding agnlrmf the elimination of structural and cultural Inequality. See Glroui. 'living Dangerously: Identity Politics and the New Cultural Racism; Towards a Critical Pedagogy of Representation', 7 Cultural Survival (199 3), 2. See also F. Furedl. The New Imperial Ideology of Imperialism: Renewing the Moral Imperative (1994) . Sovereigns, at 180. examines several ways in which the idea of universality of international law Is undermined by the 'politics and self-interest of hegemonic powers' and the 'dependence of its norms on western culture'. 32 The author does this In part by questioning the claims of universality and 'naturalness' assumed by international law. He analyses international law and order as an 'affirmation of western hegemony', in so far as its norms provide for the 'legal, political and ideological conditions of sovereignty and self-determination in the post-colonial era'.
33 For these reasons. Sovereigns, Quasi-Soverelgns and Africans represents a strong form of anti-colonial international legal scholarship.
There are two ways in which Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns and Africans sets out to demonstrate international law's hegemony: first by exploring 'its modes of operation (perceptions, philosophical interpretations, values) and second, by examining its functions (the reproduction of international order) '. 34 At the level of international law's mode of operation as a hegemonic structure, Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns and Africans proceeds from the view that 'European perceptions of the self and their metaphysical representations have been crucial to the structure of international law'. 35 It is for this reason that Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns and Africans notes that international law has a fixation for a self based on the 'European ego as the sole locus of inter-communal relations'.
36 These representations of the European self, and the contrasting non-European other, form the basis of simultaneous exclusion and inclusion and are grounded on differences or similarities of religion, culture or race.
That the significance of the self and other is an arbitrary process of identity forms 'the basis of specific juridical norms and legal doctrines' 37 is the argument advanced in Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns and Africans. Grovogui traces the emergence of the self-other process of identity as a political consensus among learned Europeans -Initially the clergy, theologians, royal courts, and publicists ... through three discursive genres: ecclesiastical, enlightenment, and the colonial. Each genre of representation emerged during a specific historical phase: the middle ages for the ecclesiastical mode; the sixteenth century Reformation and its aftermath for the Enlightenment equivalent; and the nineteenth century new imperialism for the colonial version.
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In another important contribution to this scholarly inquiry, Antony Anghie, borrowing from Edward Said's methodology, has argued that the history and theory of international law in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is structured around a 'series of contrasting national identities, races, and languages' 39 with Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns and Africans adds that this 'western culture' Is 'endlessly in quest of material well-being and ... [its] reliance on violence to achieve political ends ... rights, property and political representation that derive from a distinction between political and juridical spheres that Is non-existent in any other culture'." Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns and Africans argues that the European-non-European axis is characterized by a philosophical background that totalizes its cultural political, economic and legal systems of knowledge as a basis for sustaining Its hegemony. eventually, Judicial Interpretations of these legal objects, which established the key principles of international law: communal sovereignty, freedom of trade, and guaranteed right to private property.
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Acknowledging that international law is not simply Eurocentric, since the colonial or imperial encounter between the Europeans and non-Europeans 45 resulted in cross-cultural 'borrowing', similarly suggests that non-European civilizational orders that came in contact with European imperial governance were also influenced and shaped by this encounter.
4 * In other words -should we think of the representation of non-European identity as being homogeneous or as if it was shared and stable in the discourse of the Eurocentric and imperial international law?
Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns and Africans does not ignore this implication of a shared and stable African identity in his analysis of the Namibian decolonization. To do so would be to ignore and disguise the deep fractures along class, economic, gender, ethnic and political lines within Namibian society as perhaps in any other society.
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These alternative and multiple frames of identity are disguised by the homogenizing effect of the hegemonic character of international law scholarship as much as by nationalist coalition building and scholarship. IntlL (1996) 421. 47 The realignment of colonial categories (eg., the Inversion of the European superiority/ African inferiority axis discussed above) also had the simultaneous consequence of camouflaging the class differences and imperial nlHanrwi among the African people. Another critique of the European-non-European dichotomy has come from 'feminists and "halfies" -people whose national or cultural origin Is mixed', see (1989) . All of these authors explore how various African customary laws got 'formauKd in the turbulent early colonial years, when the powers of chiefs and heads of households were threatened by the new freedoms opened up to women and young men through the enlargement of the labour and produce markets, the abolition of slave trade, and official restrictions on the political use of witchcraft operations. ... In rapidly changing times, the codification of customary law was a weapon of present social control rather than a summary of past history.' Lonsdale, * Africa Pasts In Africa's Future', In B. Berman and J. Lonsdale, Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa. Book One: Stale and Class (1992) 209. goals of the colonial political economy. Legal Polycentricity therefore lacks a concept of power and this depoliticizes one of its central themes -that international law is Eurocentric. Eurocentricity is explored as a neutral concept stripped of its historical association with imperialism and colonization of non-European societies.
Anti-Colonial Reconstructions of Material and Economic Domination
As noted above, Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns and Africans traces the Eurocentric imprint in international law against the backdrop of the European-non-European dichotomy. It traces this dichotomy to a whole range of European philosophy, social theory, academic writing, opinion, traveller reports, trader and missionary reports some of which date as far back as 'ecclesiastical interpretations of the universe' from the Middle Ages. 51 What ties these diverse sources together is their political consensus on the opposition between the self (European/Christian) as the legal subject of international law on the one hand, and the other (non-European) as the opposite or mirror image of the European subject.
The European-non-European framework, for example, manifested itself in the relationship between European 'Christian rights' within and outside Europe from the twelfth century. Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns and Africans argues that it is the nature of these rights which in turn led to 'transformations within the church and ... struggle for political authority between temporal rulers and the papacy'.
52 It attributes extension of political authority over non-Christian people to an ecclesiastical consensus among European powers, which is dated to the period after 1492 with the discovery of the 'New World Infidels', European Jews, Africans and peoples indigenous to the Caribbean, as distinct from the 'Old World Infidels', the Chinese, Indians and Muslims.
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The Christian-non-Christian dichotomy provided an important interpretive framework for an authoritative interpretation of the denial and erasure of non-European subjectivity and humanity. Other than being non-European, Sovereigns, QuasiSovereigns and Africans traces the denial of non-European humanity and subjectivity to beliefs, attitudes, opinions and prejudices in European thought and history, such as the unequal endowment of non-Europeans with reason; their lack of, or different form of government and private property; their strange and backward culture and customs; and their lack of literacy.
These views laid the justification for the enslavement and consequent colonization of non-European societies, thereby providing a role for international law, in part, to purvey this Eurocentric justificatory regime. Eurocentricism as embedded in international law comprises the belief that the progress brought about... in capitalist Europe Is Inherently superior and has a historical mission which must finally prevail in the world... backward countries or nations have the prospect of development and progress, but only through the agency of, following the path of, and in so far as they do not interfere with the main European historical agents and their needs.
54
After all, non-European races needed European 'guidance' 'to bring civilisation and light to a continent... characterized as dark'. 55 The Christian and enlightenment mission of salvation was thereby transformed Into one of colonial conquest.
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Sovereigns, Quasi-Soverelgns and Africans provides the example of the grant of quasi-sovereign authority over non-European people to 'private European agents, settlers, and commercial companies' 57 through juridical instruments by colonial powers, as an Initial illustration of how the European-non-European framework formed the basis of juridical rules and norms of international law. Sovereigns, Quasi-Soverelgns and Africans examines the juridical rules and norms that emerged from the delegation of sovereignty by European powers to private European agents, settlers and commercial companies not only as a reflection of the European-nonEuropean dichotomy, but also as a legal expression of the political domination and economic exploitation of non-Europeans. 58 An example of the erasure of African subjectivity in the new juridical rules and norms is reflected in the assumption that 'Africans maintained an imperfect relation to their environment, including land and its natural resources'. 59 This view in turn Justified the 'right' of the colonizing powers to acquire African land since It was considered ownerless. In essence, 'positivists replaced the existing juridical idioms and rights with new ones, through metaphysical processes that entitled European claimants to political authority, land and resources'. 61 Positivism therefore contributed to the emergence of private property and contract as primary planks of colonial relations. However, as Grovogui notes, these 'contractual agreements resulted from unequal power relations and foreign idioms... [and] imposed unilateral burdens on the indigenous populations'." " Larraln. 'Classical Political Economy and Marx on Colonialism and "Backward Nations '", 19 World Development (1991) Consequently, Grovogui is critical of making distinctions between the norms of international law and their 'given meaning' on the one hand, and the 'constitution of their operations: international polities', on the other hand.
63 Such a separation of norm and praxis denies the hierarchical, racist and imperial underpinnings of international law. In this view, international law cannot be regarded as a neutral normative regime whose otherwise efficient workings are compromised by opportunistic interests and forces external to it Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns and Africans therefore examines the hierarchical international legal order, the racist oppositions between Europeans and non-Europeans and European imperialism, not as anomalous policies inconsistent with international order, but rather as intrinsic parts of it 64 Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns and Africans, examines the arrangements reached by an overwhelming majority of European countries in the 1884-1885 Berlin conference, the 1920 League Covenant and the 1945 United Nations conference as having formally instituted the unequal juridical-political relations established through colonial rule. The Berlin Treaty agreed upon at the Berlin conference, referred to the responsibility of the Western nations to 'watch over the preservation of the native populations and to supervise the improvement of the conditions of their moral and material well-being'. 65 The benign nature of the notion of watching over and improving the conditions of the native populations is contrasted with the desire on the part of the colonial powers to establish a framework for 'collective access and free trade' 66 within Africa among the European powers. This contrast between watching over and improving the conditions of native populations and the collective access and free trade of the colonial powers over Africa exemplifies for Grovogui what he terms a basic contradiction of colonial philosophy: paternal protection and radical exploitation.
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These two elements of colonial rule worked in a complementary manner, although they evoke contradictory aspirations at face value. Grovogui observes that this contradiction was also evident among abolitionists who preached Christian humanism, commerce and emancipation. 6 * Namibia, formerly German West Africa, provides the case study for hard evidence to illustrate the actual workings of this contradictory colonial philosophy. In a typical story of how colonial control was acquired through guile, force and contract all combined, Grovogui discusses how German rule was imposed upon the Herero and the Nama communities in the second half of the nineteenth century. New institutions such as a paramount chief among the Herero were established 69 The post First World War League of Nations settlement is reflected as a new stage in the imperial domination of Africa. In Grovogui's view, it emphasized the 'obligation (the duty of the civilised) as the new basis of any form or measure of political (or administrative) control (or supervision) of the German territories'.
72 While the Berlin Treaty enshrined the responsibility of Europe in watching over and improving the conditions of native populations, the League of Nations settlement enshrined a new but not so different 'liberal consensus', the sacred trust oj civilization. 71 It was upon this consensus that the mandate system was formulated, with African mandates such as South West Africa ranking C, the lowest in the hierarchy, while Palestine got an A status.
74 Woodrow Wilson and General Smuts of South Africa in fact supported the exclusion of South West Africa from the international supervisory mechanism (the mandate system) that was agreed upon after the First World War. The latter justified his decision on account of the fact that German colonies in 'the Pacific and Africa ...
[were] inhabited by barbarians, who not only cannot possibly govern themselves, but to whom it would be impractical to apply any idea of political self determination in the European sense'. 75 The rhetoric of responsibility and guardianship of European people Article 22(1) of the League of Nations Covenant provided for the establishment of the mandate system as a 'sacred trust of civilisation' for the 'well being and development' of the peoples in the mandates. This ArrJde continued to provide for the establishment of a three-tiered hierarchy of mandates, A, B. and C. While, it was not in doubt that Class A mandates (which were European) would ultimately become self-governing, there was a dispute whether this also applied to Class C mandates (of which Namibia is a good example). In fact. Artide 22(6) of the League of Nations Covenant provided that Class C mandates were territories which 'owing to the sparseness of their population or their small, or their remoteness from the centres of civilisation ...
[needed] to be administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory.' For a critical review of the mandatory system in this regard, see Anghte, supra note 41, at 454-457; Idem, supra note 13, at 215-287.
Sovereigns, at 130-131. Grovogul observes that there was 'greater sensitivity to nationalism in the former German colonies in the Ottoman dependence than in South West Africa. Consequently, more favourable mandates were established here in as far as they required Britain and France to recognise Arab leaders in this region' (Ibid, at 130-131). Grovogul notes that the classification of South West Africa as a Class C mandate 'confirmed South Africa's prediction that nothing In the post war arrangements proscribed the Integration of the territory Into its own' (Ibid, at 137). South Africa's Interest in South West Africa was mainly economic and as such sought the least restrictive terms for accounting for Its activities in South West Africa to the international community under the League's Mandate system. over non-European people dominated the direction that non-European colonies would take in the post First World War settlement 76 The trusteeship system of the United Nations system established after the Second World War continued this idea that 'Western powers entrusted a number of countries to assume responsibility for the trust territories'. 77 After the First World War, South Africa assumed control over South West Africa, replacing Germany as the new imperial power.
Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns and Africans departs from the emancipatory view of the law of self-determination adopted in international law in the post-decolonization period. Departing from the view that decolonization totally emancipated or totally terminated the various forms of control of the former colonial countries and attendant private interests over their colonies, it contends that far from being an 'ethical basis of international order', international law is 'but a means to hegemony' of European powers over non-European countries.
78 Using Namibia's anti-colonial struggle, Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns and Africans demonstrates that 'decolonisation was not an unconstrained exercise by the formerly colonised of a universally applicable right to self determination ... [rather, it] was driven primarily by the desire of the Western nations to maintain existing hierarchies of the international order and the attempt by Third World nations to subvert those structures'.
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Grovogui summarizes these views as follows:
The relationship between the European self and the non-European other has been characterized primarily by confrontation arising from European expansion and the ensuing exploitation of the other. This exploitative Interaction has been organized around a set of values, an Ideology, whose philosophic system, or episteme emerged during the Enlightenment to guide Western praxis.... In addition, the constellation of principles and rules that applied to non-Europeans was part of a generative process dependent upon a tradition of alterlty and erasure, of silencing the rights of non-Western claims, and interests of non-Westem societies.* 0 Against this background, Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns and Africans inquires into the hostility among some liberals from Western countries of 'third world proposals either to restructure the international order or change the existing norms'. 81 Grovogui does this by revisiting the defeated attempt by a number of Third World countries to, inter alia, restructure international economic relations to establish a balance between thelr predominantly raw-material-producing economies and Western industrial and now increasingly service-oriented economies on the basis of a 'New International Economic Order' (NIEO). For example, Robert H. Jackson, one of the liberal Grovogui also notes that as understood after the First World War. the principles of self-determination and popular sovereignty were Dot mentioned as being applicable to colonies outside Europe. (1996) 418 summarizes this tension between, on the one hand, a strict formal notion of sovereignty that does not accommodate Intervention and, on the other. Its reinterpreted or reformulated counterpart that derives authority not from the sovereign will but from the people themselves (and as such accommodates intervention for serious human rights abuses) as follows: This formalism is a fighting faith, a defence of forms, responsive to scepticism and pragmatism. International Law in this century has developed in the clash between these Ideas -between a set of forms, legal constructs, and a set of political and sociological sensitivities.' Kennedy notes that the move from formalism to pragmatism In International law is told as one of progress or social evolution. Such a critical appraisal is important because these scholars had a better and more subtle understanding of the problems that African countries were confronting by having to adopt an international legal regime alien to them than Grovogui may have appreciated. I would however add that these scholars ought to be read against the sort of contextual backdrop sketched out in this review. More work in this area, however, needs to be undertaken.
Conclusion: Towards Solidaristic Reconstructions of International Society
Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns and Africans ends with the challenge to African countries to 'experiment with new approaches to the questions of democracy, pluralism, co-operation, and global responsibility ... [to] revisit our intellectual assumptions, and perhaps our political agendas, in order to promote a new vision of human solidarity and global inter-dependence'.
90 Grovogui leaves us with the hope that 'we might still save ourselves from global catastrophe if we apply self determination and multilateralism to the future course of International relations '. 91 While I applaud the excellent research and analysis of Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns and Africans, I suggest that more could have been said about the limitations that have been confronted in attempts at restructuring international relations, or conceptions of democracy, cooperation and global responsibility. The attempt to restructure the International economy proposed in the NIEO is one example mentioned in the book. Although Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns and Africans is appropriately critical of liberal commentators who have looked upon the attempt to restructure international economic relations with claims of the inevitability of an international free market economy In place of planned or managed economies, it nevertheless falls short of pointing out a basic feature of liberal argument: that as a matter of political philosophy that is quite well accepted even within political theory discussions in many Western countries, the relationship between markets and politics is, as a matter of principle, contestable. 92 The relationship between markets and politics has no singular, natural and necessary form that can be reproduced from place to place or country to country as proposed by the Bretton Woods Institutions and the United States. 93 In a sense, therefore, calls to restructure the international economy through the liberal parameters of international law cannot be seen as self-defeating, as some otherwise critical commentators within international law have observed in advancing justifications for the failure of the effort to restructure the international economy through the NTEO. Another important feature of the liberal response to restructuring the international economy using international law has been what Mohammed Bedjaoui has referred to as legal paganism. 9 * Legal paganism refers to the refusal to acknowledge attempts to restructure international law or the global economy on the basis that these attempts promote claims that have no legal basis. In other words, legal paganism refers to the notion that a revision of international economic relations would unduly destabilize the present international legal order and subject it to the whims of developing countries. The Charter for the Economic Rights and Duties of States which embodied some of the principal demands of the NIEO. for example, was recognized as an example of soft law: it failed to reach a level of legality that would have constituted it as hard law. The ostensible reason for this was that there was little international consensus over its claims. This typical response to claims to restructure the international political economy is not unfamiliar, even within domestic jurisdictions. The bifurcation of legal claims (representing the status quo) on the one hand, and moral claims or soft law (deviations from the status quo or challenges to it) on the other hand, is a liberal strategy for perpetrating an unjust status quo by adopting the political posture that oppositional claims may in time become legal principles when they attain or command a sufficient level of legality. While the oppositional claims arise from a communitarian conception of international society based on ideals of solidarity and democratic accountability, those representing the legality of the status quo selfrepresent as neutral, natural and objective and are based on individualistic conceptions where the will of states gives legitimacy to the prevailing international law. Consequently, a departure from the present rules, as posed by the NIEO challenge, is held in check not by an ill-advised resort to liberal legality, but rather in spite of it. In other words, one cannot separate the rules of international law, from their praxis. As already noted earlier, such a separation would presume that international law is a neutral regime whose otherwise unproblematic workings are compromised opportunistic forces external to it. Such presumptions are false and only serve to disguise the participation of international law in the colonial and neo-colonial projects of various interests and their particular and myriad manifestations.
In addition, these debates ought to be considered within their appropriate historical and political context. This historical context includes the following factors: (i) The debt crisis, which followed the relatively optimistic decade of the 19 70s, had ravaging effects on many developing countries. The high levels of borrowing by developing countries from developed countries and private capital during this optimistic period led to accumulation of high debt burdens following a recession in many developed countries. This recession prompted a hike in interest rates on the debt These high levels of interest set off the debt crisis by the end of the 19 80s as developing countries then heavily In debt became unable to repay their (ill) The rise of neo-Iiberal reformism and Its hostility to autonomous or alternative models of industrial and development strategy in developing countries was exacerbated by a constantly deteriorating international market for agricultural products from developing countries and-a hostile international economy organized to exclude agricultural commodities from a liberal multilateral trading framework (GATT) through agreements such as the multi-fiber arrangement
In East Asia, some developing countries have maintained high growth rates for at least three decades now. 10° The increasing differentiation among developing countries and the changed international political and economic conditions need to be taken into account in assessing new forms of disempowerment for developing countries, as well World (1990) , esp. at 69-80. Chimnl also notes that the preferential treatment given to developing countries to enable them to meet balance of payments obligations In the GATT regime was undermined In the Uruguay Round of nrgnti as the sources and limitations of those that have differentiated themselves by their spectacular economic performance. In no sense, however, should this analysis be taken to suggest that political, social and economic problems in developing countries should be seen as exclusively arising from the neo-colonial relationships between these countries on the one hand, and Western industrial countries, transnational capital, and international financial and economic institutions, on the other hand. Rather, the importance of structural analysis and historical experience in understanding developing country issues lies in their under-representation in contemporary and mainstream analysis. That said, there is a significant theme that the strong form of anti-colonial scholarship of Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns and Africans can borrow from the weak form of anti-colonial scholarship in Legal Polycentricity: that perhaps one place to look for inspiration for new visions of human solidarity and global interdependence would be within the rich civilizational diversity that Legal Polycentricity discusses at length. Although Legal Polycentricity does not provide us with any detailed perspective for such a reconstruction of international society (yet I recognize that one cannot romanticize the varied and rich forms of collective existence and identity), the need for reconstruction or reconstitution of global politics and economics cannot be understated. The neo-llberal regime of national economic reconstruction for global economic integration as an accepted dogma in mainstream liberal international law scholarship serves to legitimize Euro-American imperial neo-colonialism in alliance with Third World ruling and leading business elites over most of the developing world.
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Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns and Africans charts an important research agenda for anti-colonial international legal scholarship. For its part, Legal Polycentricity revives an important debate, one that flags the importance of the scholarly contributions and/or perspectives of the Third World to international law. Sovereigns, QuasiSovereigns and Africans, however, invites us to appreciate the complicated relationship between cultures and civilizations as is manifest and latent in international legal norms, doctrines, principles, policies and the structural relationships between powerful and less powerful countries as we continue to undertake this challenge.
The revitallzation of anti-colonial international legal scholarship that these books represent is therefore welcome for being so opportune. In particular, the books help to illustrate that there is a more subtle reading of the scholarship of the first generation of African international lawyers, such as that of the late Taslim Olawale Ellas and Mohammed Bedjaoui, than presently exists. This is all the more important in view of the fact that some of the major themes these scholars were grappling with in the 1960s and 1970s correspond with the themes covered in the books under review here. This continuation of themes from earlier decades in contemporary international legal scholarship is highly suggestive of the possibilities of further developing strategies/approaches not only to the themes discussed here, but to many more as well.
